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Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides a formal analysis of the welfare and trade implications of eco-labeling 
schemes. A simple model of vertical (quality) differentiation captures major stylized features of 
the textiles market in which trading takes place between an industrialized North (domestic) and a 
developing South (foreign). The paper investigates several labeling scenarios (labeling by North, 
labeling by both North and South, and harmonization). A labeling scheme in the North without 
the South’s participation is detrimental to both the North’s and the South’s producers of 
conventional textiles. In aggregate, the North’s textiles industry benefits from the introduction of 
the label. If the South creates its own label, it regains market share in aggregate, but at the cost of 
its conventional textiles sector; both of North’s industries lose. Consumers gain with a wider 
choice and with higher quality of textile goods. They would favor upward international 
harmonization of eco-labels towards the higher quality of the North, as long as the South 
participates in production and provides some cost discipline. 
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ECO-LABELS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TEXTILES 
 
Introduction 
We provide a formal analysis of the welfare and trade implications of eco-labeling schemes. 
We couch our analysis in the context of a stylized model of the textiles market in which trading 
takes place between an industrialized North (domestic) and a developing South (foreign). 
Textiles eco-labeling involves production-process standards, raising concerns of protectionism 
harming the South. We investigate several labeling scenarios (labeling by North, labeling by 
both North and South, and harmonization of both labels). 
Our investigation fills a gap in the literature on eco-labeling and trade. Non-quantitative case 
studies constitute the bulk of the literature (Jha and Zarrilli, OECD, and Zarsky). Mattoo and 
Singh offer a simplistic model of eco-labeling that fails to formally differentiate quality. 
Kirchhoff provides the only formal treatment of some aspects of eco-labeling and associated 
standards in an open economy context. In a paper related to ours, Bureau et al. address the case 
of hormone labeling for the beef trade, accounting explicitly for quality. 
We consider a large home country, the North, that imports conventional textile goods from 
the South, and produces importing-competing conventional textiles as well. Both the North’s and 
the South’s exhibit increasing marginal cost of textile production. Trade is initially distorted by 
the North’s import tariff, as would be the case in the real world. In the absence of information on 
process standards, equilibrium in the textiles market prevents “green” credence attributes from 
emerging. 
Introducing an eco-label allows markets to value process attributes (credence good) and to 
reward producers of environment-friendly attributes. The label increases the cost of production 
by imposing process-standards on the production of the green apparel. We model the eco-label as 
the information on a process attribute, which becomes a search attribute with labeling. We 
characterize the environmental attribute of textiles as a quality scalar, using a model of vertical 
differentiation. Conventional textile goods are at the lower bound on the quality attribute.  
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Eco-labeled goods meet some process standards and convey their higher environmental quality 
to consumers through the label. 
For simplicity we assume that only one “quality” of conventional textiles exists. We further 
motivate this assumption in the model presentation. For its domestic market the home country 
then introduces the eco-label scheme. We initially assume that the labeling scheme precludes the 
foreign industry's presence in the eco-labeled market. Two goods are now present on the 
domestic market: eco-labeled textiles produced in the North and conventional textiles produced 
by both the North and the South. 
The label has several effects. Consumers benefit from a larger choice set, and those who 
highly value the environmental quality of the textile good, switch to the higher quality. Demand 
for conventional textile decreases. Trade protection exacerbates the relative loss of market share 
for conventional imports. The domestic conventional textiles industry is also hurt by the label but 
to a lesser extent because of the tariff protection. Once the label is in place, both the North’s 
textile producers (labeled and conventional) benefit from increasing the import tariff. The 
specific tariff has a direct protectionist effect on both industries in the North and an additional 
indirect substitution effect via the relative price of the two textile goods. 
If the South responds with its own eco-label, it creates an intermediate quality between the 
conventional and the North’s eco-labeled textiles. It regains some of the lost surplus. The welfare 
of the South’s conventional textiles industry declines further. Northern consumers gain from the 
wider choice, but both the North’s industries lose from the increased quality competition. 
Surprisingly, under plausible conditions, the South’s suppliers of eco-labeled textiles benefit 
more from upward- rather than downward–harmonization. As expected, the conventional textile 
industry in the South would rather harmonize the quality downward. It would regain market 
share in the export market with less quality competition. Northern consumers have their welfare 
increasing in all textile qualities and would never favor a downward harmonization of eco-labels.  
We have another finding that goes against conventional wisdom of a “leveled playing field” 
in integrated international markets. We find that the North’s textiles industry would rather not 
harmonize eco-labels and standards as long as these translate into valuable attributes as 
perceived by consumers. 
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Next, we give a brief history of eco-labels in general before focusing on the textile market in 
particular. We review important stylized facts and issues associated with eco-label schemes. 
Then we present a parsimonious model, which incorporates these stylized facts. Following that, 
we analyze the two eco-labeling cases described above and summarize numerical comparative-
statics results pertaining to the harmonization of labels. Then, we present conclusions. 
 
Brief History of Eco-Labels in General 
Both in Europe and North America environmental concerns arose in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
to a prominence in public discourse never before known. Consumers were urged to put their 
money where their mouth was and purchase environmentally friendly goods so as to pressure 
firms to mend their ways. “Green consumerism” was born and with it came a deluge of greener 
than thou claims by manufacturers. Claims such as “eco-friendly,” “environmentally safe,” 
“recyclable,” “biodegradable,” “ozone friendly,” “safe in a landfill,” etc., bombarded consumers 
(West). Differentiating fact from fiction and meaningful from irrelevant became difficult and so 
the idea of third party certification via eco-labels was born. This section provides an overview of 
the development and difficulties of eco-labels from their start in 1978 with Germany’s Blue 
Angel to the present. 
Eco-labels are designed to inform consumers that the labeled product is more 
environmentally friendly than most in its product category. The hope is to harness latent or 
undirected consumer preferences for green goods to encourage firms to develop and adopt 
products and technologies that mitigate ecological externalities. The successful widespread 
implementation of eco-labels has yet to be achieved in part because of de facto barrier to trade 
concerns. 
The proliferation of confusing claims by manufacturers led to the proliferation of 
environmental labeling schemes, the sheer number of which, again, threatens consumer 
confusion and confidence in them (Lohr). Bringing fuller information about a product’s 
environmental impact is the goal of eco-labels. There are essentially two types of eco-labels. The 
first focuses on the overall environmental impact of a product, often employing a life cycle or 
“cradle to grave” type analysis (LCA). This roughly corresponds to a Type I label as defined by 
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ISO 14024. The ISO defines these as “voluntary, multiple criteria based practitioner programs 
that award labels claiming overall environmental preference of a product within a particular 
category, based on life cycle considerations.” LCA should play an important role in addressing 
ecological impacts with respect to extraction of resources, manufacturing, distribution, use, 
recovery, and disposal. There are a great deal of similarities between ISO 14024 or Type I labels 
and ISO 14040 which exclusively employs LCA analysis. The major distinction is that while 
LCA must play an important role it need not be the sole criterion. 
The second type of eco-label is a single-issue label granted by a third party certification 
agency that refers to a specific environmental or sometimes ethical characteristic of a product, 
e.g., certified organic cotton, dolphin safe tuna fishing, or sustainable forestry. This roughly 
translates into an ISO 14000 Type IV label (Kuhre). The ISO has not yet released single-issue 
guidelines to the public. Type II labels are those environmental claims made by the manufacturer 
itself. Type III labels are known as quantified product information (QPI) labels. While less 
common than the other types, the idea is that the third party certification agency would use 
several environmental performance indicators (EPI), e.g., energy use, air emissions, water 
emissions, etc., to compile an environmental score for each product that consumers could use to 
compare different goods. They could then purchase the good with the best score. Our paper 
concentrates on Type I eco-labels. 
Established in 1978, Germany’s Blue Angel is the oldest and one of the most respected eco-label 
schemes. As of December 1996, 960 manufacturers or importers had been awarded the Blue 
Angel for a total of 4,100 products in 76 different product categories (OECD). While there are 
about 30 eco-labeling schemes in operation worldwide, after Germany’s Blue Angel the other 
major ones include the Nordic White Swan, the Swedish Environmental Choice, the EU Eco-
Label Award Scheme, the Canadian Environmental Choice Program, the American Green Seal, 
the Japanese Eco-Mark, and the French NF Environment (West). Most are government 
organizations but the U.S. Green Seal and the Swedish Environmental Choice programs are 
private. They all strive, albeit with varying degrees of stringency, to employ life cycle analysis in 
criteria determination. Although the details of the process vary across agencies, the general 
procedure for the development of eco-labels is characterized by the following sequential steps:  
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(1) product selection, (2) criteria development, (3) public review process, (4) adoption of final 
criteria, (5) application to competent body for eco-label, (6) testing and verification, and then  
(7) award of eco-label (OECD). 
Analysis based on the life cycle approach is generally accepted as the ideal and indeed there 
has been a recent trend toward honest implementation of this approach. The lack of an accepted 
methodology for LCA implementation, however, has retarded its widespread application and 
most major certification agencies still focus on the use and disposal of the product. The 
fundamental problem centers on the inherent difficulty in assessing and comparing different 
ecological impacts. For example, it is difficult to compare a product that is biodegradable but 
produced in an energy intensive process with a product produced with less energy but has a half-
life of five million years (Jha and Zarrilli). Although successful eco-label schemes must involve 
industry in the criteria development phase, if firms are expected to apply and pay for the labels, 
the criticism has been leveled that firms have too much influence. Although in theory LCA 
pleases everyone, who gets to determine how different ecological impacts are weighted is subject 
to great controversy and poses one of the major challenges facing successful implementation of 
eco-labels in a broader spectrum of products. 
From the perspective of less developed countries (LDC) the most contentious source of 
debate centers on their concern that eco-labeling schemes may serve as de facto barriers to trade. 
They anticipate greater difficulty attaining the certification than do firms in the issuing countries. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) faces the challenge of reconciling eco-label schemes with 
the technical barriers to trade (TBT) chapter of the 1993 Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
(UR-GATT). One could argue that eco-labels are a form of a national certification system, 
implying that Article 7 of TBT applies. Article 7 mandates that such certification schemes must 
be implemented in such a way that they do not “have the effect of creating unnecessary barriers 
to trade” (Jha and Zarrilli). 
There is some debate as to whether or not TBT applies to voluntary certification systems 
but, even so, successful implementation of eco-labels requires at least a good faith effort to 
consider the input and concerns of all potentially impacted parties. Jha and Zarrilli note that eco-
labels may be considered to violate TBT if (1) “the determination of the criteria to which the 
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product must conform in order to qualify for the label, in particular with regard to use of raw 
materials and production and processing method, is not based on objective or scientific 
consideration or fail to take into account adequately the production processes prevailing in other 
countries; (2) procedures for verification in granting the label are unnecessarily strict or rigorous, 
thereby making it almost impossible for a foreign producer to obtain the label; or (3) the system 
is prepared and adopted for a product which is almost entirely imported, and the right to grant an 
eco-label rests entirely with authorities of the importing countries.” 
In 1992 Brazil was the first country to raise trade concerns over eco-labels when the Council 
of European Communities chaired by Denmark adopted criteria for a pulp and paper products 
eco-labeling scheme. Brazilian manufacturers/exporters were not involved in the criteria 
development phase and feared they would be adversely affected. The standards were determined 
with European but not Brazilian environmental needs and production practices in mind. This 
case is typical of the concerns expressed by LDC’s. For instance, waste reduction is an 
environmental priority in the European Union (EU) and so the EU eco-labeling scheme rewards 
the use of recycled paper. Another country that exports paper products to the EU may benefit 
more from reforestation efforts and would prefer eco-labels to reward firms practicing 
sustainable forest management. Furthermore, with little environmental improvement, a LDC’s 
comparative advantage may be adversely affected if qualifying for the eco-label means adopting 
the EU’s capital intensive means of production required to incorporate recycling. Although 
voluntary, if the eco-labels ultimately result in a de facto standard required by consumers, non-
consulted countries fear this may eventually affect their ability to export to the labeling country. 
This highlights the need for eco-labeling schemes to incorporate enough flexibility to reward 
different environmental goals as long as the net effect on the environment is positive (Jha and 
Zarrilli). 
In some cases the selection of criteria and thresholds can be so narrow as to effectively 
mandate a particular technology. This is particularly true for textiles. A private German eco-
labeling scheme proposed two types of eco-labels—the MST (Marke scadstoffgeprufter 
Textilien) relates to attributes of the final product and the MUT (Marke umweltschonender 
Textilien) relates to the production process of textiles. There are several ways in which this could 
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constitute a trade barrier. German firms may be more able to comply with the standards because 
they were involved in development of the standards and may already possess the technical 
competence required. Most strikingly Jha and Zarrilli report that after examining the proposed 
MST label’s requirements, the criteria would mean that LDC’s would have to import dyestuffs 
from Germany or other EU countries. This would disproportionately raise the cost of 
certification for LDC’s. Such inflexible guidelines almost mandate that a particular technology 
be used that prohibited natural dyes, often used by LDC’s, even though in most cases they would 
be just as environmentally sound. The other proposed textile label, MUT, would require on-site 
inspections particularly costly for LDC’s.  
The Eco-Tex Standard 100 for textiles is another label developed in a more international 
context but still sponsored by German and Austrian research institutes. The impacts on human 
health not ecological concerns dominate the criteria. This was done in acknowledgement of the 
difficulty posed by on site inspections. Eco-Tex set standards for a textile eco-label but will not 
award such labels. Despite soliciting a broader range of concerns and inputs, the criteria are still 
similar to that of the MST label and would be expected to have similar trade effects. In general 
eco-labels for textiles have been slow in achieving widespread acceptance largely because, in the 
spirit of LCA, it is clear that any honest eco-label will have to incorporate on site inspections as 
well as limitations on inputs and technologies used, either of which could be considered a 
violation of the TBT. 
This is particularly important in light of potential future increases in the range of products 
covered by eco-labels. Zarrilli looks at the importation of potentially eco-labeled products into 
the EU, the Nordic countries, and Canada. She finds in these three markets that the products 
included in the eco-label schemes represent fairly small percentages of total imports. In Canada 
they account for 1.2 percent of imports, in the Nordic countries the figure rises to 2.5 percent and 
is slightly larger at 3.3 percent for the EU. When focusing on imports from LDC’s of products 
that are planned to be or are already included in eco-labeling schemes, larger differences 
amongst the three markets emerge. The share of “potentially” eco-labeled products from LDC’s 
in total imports of eco-labeled products is a negligible 0.9 percent for the Nordic countries and 
fairly small for Canada at 5.8 percent but for the EU the figure rises to a much larger 44.9 
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percent. Since textiles and apparel items constitute a substantial portion of the imports from 
LDC’s, the trade diversion impacts of eco-labels in this market is of particular interest (Zarrilli). 
Harmonization is often offered as a solution to the potential trade barrier problems posed by eco-
labels (Jha). 
 
Some Stylized Facts on Eco-Labels in Textiles 
Third-party institutions, either nongovernment organizations (NGOs) or governmental 
agencies, administer eco-labels. These labels increase the cost of production by imposing fees 
and standards. This is particularly true for eco-labeling schemes in textiles, which require 
multiple production standards for dyes, fibers and bleaching chemicals (OECD). For illustration, 
Table 1 shows some of the EU process standards for maximum allowable heavy metal residues 
in dyes used in eco-textiles. 
 
able 1. Some EU standards for eco-labeled T-shirts and bed linens 
   
Maximum amount of metals in pigments and dyestuff 
Arsenic 
Pigments (PPM) 
250 
Dyestuff (PPM)
50 
Cadmium 50 20 
Chromium 100 100 
Copper - 250 
Mercury 25 4 
Nickel - 200 
Lead 100 100 
Zinc - 1000 
SOURCE: European Commission Directorate General 
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These standards increase cost of production. Data on cost of eco-textiles are scarce. In the 
United States, eco-labeled apparel items command a price premium of about 30 percent with 
respect to comparable conventional apparel items. This 30 percent markup appears to reflect cost 
of production, but the evidence is preliminary (Nimon and Beghin). Fees are imposed in most 
schemes. For example, Canada's Environmental Choice Program imposes a 0.5 percent charge 
based on the price of the good on sales up to Canadian $1,000,000. Fixed cost arises from the 
application and site inspection involved in the certification process. 
Certification is another problem mentioned in the literature (Jha and Zarrilli, OECD, 
Zarsky). Developing countries have voiced their concern that certification with industrialized 
labeling schemes may be virtually impossible for them. A glance at the EU Commission's list of 
companies that have obtained the EU environmental label reveals a pattern consistent with this 
concern. Forty-eight licenses have been granted to 32 manufacturers and two importers (from 
Finland) covering 219 products. Hence none were granted to a developing economy's company. 
A surprising fact is the small number of licenses granted. In our formal analysis we consider this 
potential exclusion of developing economies from the eco-labeled textile market. 
Eco-label schemes can be discriminatory, especially in textile markets dominated by the 
South’s producers. For example, about 80 percent of the shirt, T-shirt and bed linen consumption 
in the EU is imported from developing economies and the EU eco-label scheme could be easily 
construed as targeting the foreign production of these goods. Domestic industries have more say 
in the definition of these standards than foreign competitors do (OECD, Jha and Zarrilli). 
Abstracting from political economy considerations, the standards are likely to address 
technologies, which are feasible in industrialized countries but perhaps reflect less concern for 
the input mix and technology set of developing countries. Further, what may be considered a 
green good in China may no longer be considered green in the United States, given the 
difference in their respective marginal utility of income. Local eco-labels are emerging now in 
developing countries, especially in timber-based products, in order to promote better practice and 
preempt discriminatory labeling in the North. 
Hence, if an “optimum” label/quality could be defined, it would differ between the North 
and the South’s trading partners. Harmonization of eco-labeling policies between the North and 
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the South implies that one or both parties must compromise on their environmental valuation or 
on the cost of production beyond what is socially optimal. Despite this inherent problem, 
harmonization is part of the “fair trade” debate on labor and environmental practices. We analyze 
the implications of harmonizing eco-labels downward and upward for welfare and trade flows. 
Finally, this debate on labeling occurs in the context of a very protected textiles industry in 
the North. The last set of agreements from the Uruguay Round of the World Trade Organisation 
included a special agreement on textiles. Industrialized countries are supposed to phase out the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement quotas which will be tariffied and then progressively lowered. Currently, 
most industrialized countries have textile protection translating into an ad valorem tariff 
equivalent in excess of 100 percent. 
 
A Model of Environmental Quality Differentiation 
We follow the classical model of vertical (quality) differentiation (see Tirole, and Mussa and 
Rosen). Although abstract, this model has been recently applied by Bureau et al. to analyze the 
hormone beef dispute between the United States and the EU. Each consumer in the North 
consumes either one or no unit of the product. The heterogeneous quality of the good (its 
greenness) translates into a quality index k , which is valued by the consumer via a taste 
parameter θ . We assume the latter parameter is distributed uniformly over the consumers in the 
North. Utility, U, is a surplus measure and is as follows: U=0 if the agent does not buy, or 
pk −=    U θ  if the agent buys a unit of quality k  at price p . 
We assume there are three textile goods, differentiated by quality. One good is conventional 
textiles, with quality ck  equal between the foreign and domestic producers. The choice of ck  
represents a cost-minimizing level of the environmental attribute from optimum use of dyes and 
other pollution-generating inputs, given the constraint that it makes the conventional textiles 
acceptable to consumers, as in Shapiro. In our context, this quality of conventional textiles 
represents a minimum acceptable environmental quality for consumers based on search and 
experience attributes. Examples of such characterization would be the absence of negative health 
effects from wearing conventional clothing or of an unpleasant odor suggestive of toxic 
chemicals used in the production process. 
Eco-Labels and International Trade in Textiles  /  15 
Besides the conventional good, two “green” goods are introduced—one domestic with 
quality kg and one foreign with quality *gk . We assume that the latter green quality levels are 
defined by third-party institutions and become exogenous parameters for producers. We have the 
following assumption for the perceived qualities, ggc kkk <<
*
. Tirole shows that a higher taste 
for quality, or θ  being higher, reflects a higher income. This fact motivates gg kk <* , because, in 
the South, environmental quality corresponds to lower marginal damage of pollution than it does 
in the North. Other reasons motivate this inequality. For example, environmental degradation 
occurs with emissions from transportation, and an imported good is presumably less green, other 
things being equal, because of emissions linked to transportation. Another motivation is the 
North’s preference for the domestic environment or localized warm-glow. 
We analyze three situations. First, we look at the market without any label as a reference 
case, and then we introduce the North’s labeling scheme. Finally, we consider two competing 
labels, the North’s and the South’s. The specification of the demands for the three substitute 
goods varies, depending on the choice set in each of the three cases. Hence, we have three 
specifications for the demand for conventional textiles. We mimic label harmonization by 
shrinking the quality differential ( )*gg kk − , upward by increasing *gk , and downward by 
decreasing gk . 
 
Case 1: The Reference Case 
In the reference case with no labeled goods, both the domestic and foreign firms produce the 
same conventional quality good. Since environmental impact attributes are credence goods, only 
the conventional pollution intensive product will be produced in the absence of an independent 
third party eco-label. In this scenario demand is determined by the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between no consumption and consumption of the conventional quality, as in Mussa 
and Rosen. As in Mussa and Rosen, the taste parameter [ ]1,0∈θ  is distributed uniformly and 
with a density of 1. Consumers have the following preferences. 
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The derivation of the supply is a bit more complicated. We assume that individual producers 
have no market power and so pursue marginal cost pricing. Producer j (where a “*” will be used 
to denote the foreign firm) maximizes profit jπ  w.r.t. output, ijq . 
ijijijij qcqp 2
1     )3( −=π  where p  denotes price, c  denotes unit cost, gci  ,=  denotes quality 
(i.e., conventional, or green). 
 
The cost parameter is a function a function of quality ( )iijij kcc = , and is assumed linear in the 
numerical exercise. While the foreign firm is assumed to possess a cost advantage in the 
production of the conventional good such that *cc cc <  it faces a specific tariff ( )t . The foreign 
and domestic supplies of the conventional good are as given below. 
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With market clearing the equilibrium price and quantity is then obtained by equating demand 
with the total market supply. 
( ) ( )ccccc
cccccequil
c cckcc
ctkcckp
++
+
= **
*
     6 , and  
( ) ( )( )ccccc
cccequil
c cckcc
tccckq
++
−+
= **
*
1     7 . 
 
Since we assume that all consumption takes place in the North, the consumer surplus can be 
calculated by the following. 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ]++
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=−=
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By imposing marginal cost pricing we solve for the foreign producer surplus. 
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Similarly the domestic producer surplus can be solved. 
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12
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 where ( )ccc qcp −  is the producer surplus. 
 
The world welfare ( ) LtqPSPSCSWW cfd −+++= *just   is  then , where L is the cost of the 
label and is assumed to be borne entirely by the home country. 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )[ ] Lcckcc
tktkccctcktccckkW
ccccc
cccccccccccc
−
++
−−+++−+
= 2**
2*2*2*
2
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18  /  Nimon and Beghin 
Case 2: The North Introduces an Eco-Label 
In this scenario we analyze the case where the North introduces an eco-label and only the 
domestic firm is able to qualify for it. This focuses on the fears expressed by less developed 
countries (LDC) that the criteria for obtaining the eco-label may be chosen for national 
advantage. Domestic firms may have more influence in the criteria development stage such that 
the criteria ultimately adopted may reflect the concerns and production technology of the 
domestic industries at the expense of those in less developed countries. The concern is that these 
eco-labels will become a de facto standard that firms in LDC’s will effectively be unable to 
satisfy and their market share of the conventional item will shrink.  
In the second case, two marginal consumers at opposite ends of the taste continuum 
determine the demand for conventional textiles. Arbitrage by the marginal consumer who is 
indifferent between the utility of consuming a unit of conventional or eco-labeled textiles 





−
−
= consumer        thei.e. 1
cg
cg
kk
pp
θ  truncates the demand for conventional textiles. If the 
consumer’s taste parameter exceeds 1θ  then he purchases only the higher quality eco-labeled 
good, and if it is below that level he either purchases the lower quality conventional good or 
nothing at all. Recall that to purchase anything at all the taste parameter must be at least 
c
c
k
p
  0 =θ . This gives rise to the following derivation of the two demand functions. 
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−
−
−
−
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−
   1      13 θ . 
The same basic framework as above is used to derive the supply of the labeled green and 
unlabeled conventional goods. In this case the market supply of the conventional good is the sum 
of the North’s and the South’s supply curves. Profits maximization gives the following supply 
curves. 
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Equating these supply and demand curves generates the market equilibrium prices from which 
the market equilibrium quantities can easily be found from (14) and (15). 
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The next step is to solve for the consumer surplus. 
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For clarity of exposition expressions (18) through (20) are not given in their reduced form, but 
they can easily be made so by substituting in the equilibrium prices from (16) and (17). The 
world welfare ( ) LtqPSPSCSWW cfd −+++= *just   is  then , where L is the cost of the label 
and is assumed to be borne entirely by the home country.  
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Case 3: The South Introduces an Eco-Label of its Own 
In this scenario we analyze the case in which the South responds to the North’s eco-label by 
introducing a label of its own. In this case only the North’s firms can qualify for the eco-label 
denoting the highest quality ( )gk  and the South’s firms can only qualify for the eco-label 
denoting a lesser level of environmental quality, ( )*gk . The greenest quality also costs more for 
the North’s firms to produce so not only is ggc kkk <<
*  but ggcc cccc <<<
** . This allows us to 
then consider the implications of harmonization of the two labels. This is particularly policy 
relevant because harmonization is considered by many to be an integral step towards the 
reduction of eco-label induced trade diversion.  
Again the demand is determined as before except now there are three quality levels instead 
of two. In this case the taste parameter that characterizes the consumer who is indifferent 
between buying the domestic eco-labeled quality gk  at price gp  and the imported eco-labeled 
quality of *gk  at price 
*
gp  is *
*
2   
gg
gg
kk
pp
−
−
=θ . The demand for the imported eco-labeled textiles is 
truncated from below by 1θ  and from above by *
*
2   
gg
gg
kk
pp
−
−
=θ . With the same distributional 
assumption on θ , integration over the relevant ranges of the taste parameter gives the following 
demand functions for the three goods. 
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The supply schedule of each of the products follows, as before, from the profit maximization of 
the individual competitive firms pursuing marginal cost pricing. The supply of the conventional 
good is again the sum of the supply from both the North and the South, while the North supplies 
all gk  quality goods and the South all of the 
*
gk  quality. 
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g c
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Equating supply and demand for each of these inter-related markets yields equilibrium prices. 
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The other two prices can be more concisely expressed in terms of *gp  as follows. 
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The consumer surplus is given by the following. 
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Imposing marginal cost pricing we solve for the foreign producer surplus. 
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Similarly, one can solve for the domestic producer surplus. 
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       PS +=  
As before the world welfare ( ) ( ) LqqtPSPSCSWW gcfd −++++= **just   is  then . 
 
Numerical Simulation 
To asses the welfare and trade implications of the different cases, we choose to undertake 
numerical simulation and comparative statics, using synthetic values for the cost and quality (i.e., 
greenness) parameters involved in the model. Among the many possible values, our preferred 
parameterization reproduces key stylized facts of the textile market. For example, the set 
{t=0.008, kc=0.4, kg=0.405, c*c=0.006=0.015kc, cc=0.08=0.15kc, cg=0.081=0.15kg} leads to a 
tariff rate of 165 percent on conventional textiles imports, a market share of 83 percent for the 
South in conventional textiles, and a price markup of 32 percent for green textiles in the North. 
We tried many alternative sets of values (see Appendix). Fortunately, our comparative statics 
results hold for a wide range of values. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, our results are as follows.  
In the first case, when the home country introduces an eco-label for its domestic market, two 
goods are present on the domestic market: the North’s eco-labeled good and the conventional 
textiles good produced by both the North’s and the South’s industries. Consumers benefit from a 
larger choice set as those with a high θ can switch to the higher quality.  
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Demand for conventional textiles, including imports, decreases. The presence of the specific 
tariff, t, worsens the decline of imports of conventional textiles induced by the label. The label 
also hurts the domestic conventional textiles industry. Once the label is in place, however, it 
creates compatible interests between North producers of eco-labeled and conventional textiles to 
lobby for increased tariff protection. The specific tariff has two effects: a protectionist effect on 
both the North’s conventional and eco-labeled textiles production, and a substitution effect 
towards the higher quality eco-labeled good away from “lower” quality conventional good, as 
the relative price of the latter is inflated by the specific tariff. The net effect on the domestic 
producer of the conventional quality is positive for all parameterization values used in the 
comparative statics. 
In the next case, when the South reacts by creating its own eco-label, an intermediate quality 
emerges between the conventional and the North’s eco-labeled textile good. The South’s textile 
industry regains some of the lost surplus via exports of its own eco-labeled good. Nevertheless, 
the South’s producers of conventional textiles are even worse off. Hence, a strong divergence of 
interests would exist between adopters and non-adopters of the eco-label in the South. 
Consumers in the North gain with the expanded quality choice (three types of textiles). 
We have two unexpected results. First, the South’s suppliers of eco-labeled textiles would 
rather harmonize upward than downward, abstracting from the fixed cost of certification and as 
long as the increase in demand dominates the surplus loss from the marginal cost shift caused by 
the higher standards (a higher kg*). Closing the quality gap downward between the North’s and 
the South’s eco-labeled goods is beneficial to the South’s textiles industry as a whole. However, 
for its eco-labeled segment, downward harmonization is less lucrative than an increase in its 
quality standards relative to the North.  
Of course, the South’s producers of conventional textiles would rather see a downward 
harmonization. It would allow them to regain market share in the export market because of 
decreased quality competition. Northern consumers are always better off when any of the three 
qualities (conventional, green in the North and the South) increases. Consumers would never 
favor a downward harmonization of green labels and standards. Upward harmonization imposes 
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further competitive discipline on the North’s eco-labeled textile industry, hence benefiting 
consumers via lowered prices.  
The North’s textiles industry would rather not harmonize and benefit from a larger quality 
gap between the two competing green textile goods. This is contrary to conventional belief that 
industrialized countries want to establish fair trade and uniform environmental standards across 
trading partners. An unexpected political economy situation emerges. Conventional textile 
producers in the North and the South and green-textiles producers in the North would rather keep 
the quality of the green good in the South low. 
 
Conclusions 
We reviewed some important stylized facts of eco-labeling schemes focusing on textiles. 
Important features of these schemes motivated the main assumptions of our model and the 
questions addressed in our analysis of welfare and trade implications of eco-labels. The modeling 
approach incorporated vertical product differentiation in which quality referred to environmental 
attributes of the textile goods. The production side of the model reflects the cost advantage of 
developing economies in textile production, and the increase in cost resulting from production 
standards linked to the eco-label. 
A labeling scheme in the North without the South’s participation is detrimental to both the 
North’s and the South’s producers of conventional textiles. In aggregate, the North’s textiles 
industry benefits from the introduction of the label. If the South creates its own label, it regains 
market share in aggregate, but at the cost of its conventional textiles sector; both of North’s 
industries lose. 
Consumers gain with a wider choice and with higher quality of textile goods. They would favor 
upward international harmonization of eco-labels towards the higher quality of the North, as long 
as the South participates in production and provides some cost discipline.
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Appendix 
Sensitivity of the Results to the Parameterization 
Below are five inferences drawn in the paper based on our most preferred parameterization. 
In this section we choose 12 different parameterizations to intentionally stress the model to see if 
the inferences are robust to other specifications. The results are quite consistent across these 
alternative parameterizations. The following inferences were drawn from the original 
parameterization: 
1. If the Northern country introduces a label then CS  increases. 
2. If the Northern country introduces a label then dPS  increases. 
3. If the Northern country introduces a label then its market share of cq decreases. 
4. Once the label is in place both the domestic conventional and green makers benefit from 
increases in the tariff. 
5. Once the domestic label is in place if the South creates a label of its own then the South 
regains market share (and the North loses market share). 
To test the generality of the above claims, the analysis was re-performed given the following 
different specifications: 
1. Medium quality Southern green good becomes cheaper to produce. 
( ).015.0not      001.0 **** gggg kCkC ==  
2. High quality Northern green good becomes more expensive to produce. 
  ( ).15.0Cnot     3.0 g ggg kkC ==  
3. High Quality Northern green good becomes much more expensive to produce. 
( ).15.0Cnot      5.0 g ggg kkC == . 
4. High Quality Northern Good becomes cheaper to produce. 
  ( ).15.0Cnot      03.0 g ggg kkC ==  
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5. Conventional Quality becomes Cheaper to produce. 
( ).2.0not     01.0   and   015.0not      00075.0 ** cccccccc kCkCkCkC ====  
6. Small Decrease in the quality of conventional goods, ck = 0.38. 
7. Increase in the Quality of the Northern green good, kg=0.9. 
8. Both tariffs reduced to 0 percent. 
9. The green tariff reduced to 54 percent. 
10. The conventional tariff reduced to 0 percent. 
11. Conventional tariff increased to 213 percent. 
12. Both tariffs are doubled. 
In all of the above 12 scenarios representing different parameterizations, all five of the above 
inferences are maintained with only one exception. This exception occurs when the conventional 
tariff is increased by 213 percent and the South introduces a label of its own. In this case the 
South’s introduction of a label does not cause its overall market share to increase but rather it 
stays about the same at 54 percent. The above different parameterizations were specifically 
chosen to stress the model, and yet our inferences appear fairly insensitive to the changes. This 
gives us some confidence in the robustness of our claims. 
 
A second set of predictions involving Table 2 are made in the paper. 
1. Southern suppliers prefer to harmonize upwards rather than downwards.  
( )fdownfup PSPS >  i.e.  
In all cases but one this inference appears to hold. If the conventional tariff is eliminated 
(Case 9) then the foreign producers surplus benefits from downward harmonization but is 
actually hurt by upwards harmonization as consumers substitute away from the conventional 
goods in favor of the green ones. 
2. Northern consumers are better off when any of the three qualities ( )ggc kkk  and ,, *   
increase (i.e. CS  increases with upward harmonization and decreases with downward 
harmonization and increases with gk ). This means that Northern consumers always 
prefer upward harmonization. 
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This holds for all of the 11 parameterizations analyzed. 
3. Northern producers would prefer not to harmonize. This means that dPS  decreases with  
both upward and downward harmonization. This holds for all 11 parameterizations 
analyzed. 
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Table 2. A comparison of scenarios analyzed 
  
Reference 
Case 
Domestic 
Label 
Only 
 
Two 
Labels 
 
Price of kc 
 
0.0128 
 
0.0115 
 
0.0095 
 
Price of kg* 
   
0.0103 
 
Price of kg 
  
0.0152 
 
0.0130 
 
Consumer Surplus 
 
0.1874 
 
0.1889 
 
0.1910 
 
Foreign Producer Surplus 
 
0.0020 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0010 
 
Domestic Producer Surplus 
 
0.0010 
 
0.0027 
 
0.0020 
 
Domestic Welfare 
 
0.1949 
 
0.1962 
 
0.1980 
 
World Welfare 
 
0.1968 
 
0.1972 
 
0.1990 
 
Tax Revenue 
 
0.0065 
 
0.0046 
 
0.0050 
  
Market Share 
 
Market Share 
 
Market Share 
 
     qc* 
 
83.4 
 
59.5 
 
26.4 
 
     qc 
 
16.6 
 
14.8 
 
12.2 
 
     qg* 
 
 
  
39.9 
 
     qg 
  
25.8 
 
21.5 
Eco-Labels and International Trade in Textiles  /  29 
Table 3. Results of harmonization 
 Initial 
Values 
Upward 
Harmonization 
Downward 
Harmonization 
 kg* = 0.402 
kg = 0.405 
kg* = 0.404 
 
kg = 0.403 
 
Price of kc 
 
0.0095 
 
0.0093 
 
0.0096 
 
Price of kg* 
 
0.0103 
 
0.0107 
 
0.0104 
 
Price of kg 
 
0.0127 
 
0.0115 
 
0.0112 
 
CS 
 
0.1909 
 
0.1916 
 
0.1908 
 
PSf 
 
0.0006570 
 
0.00076 
 
0.0007031 
 
PSd 
 
0.0019 
 
0.0016 
 
0.0016 
 
Domestic Welfare 
 
0.1981 
 
0.1986 
 
0.1979 
 
World Welfare 
 
0.1987 
 
0.1994 
 
0.1986 
 
Tax Revenue 
 
0.0052 
 
0.0054 
 
0.0054 
  
Market Share 
 
Market Share 
 
Market Share 
 
     qc* 
 
26.4 
 
22.3 
 
27.4 
 
     qc 
 
12.2 
 
11.9 
 
12.3 
 
     qg* 
 
39.9 
 
46.3 
 
41.2 
 
     qg 
 
21.5 
 
19.5 
 
19.1 
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